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The People's Republic of China (PRC) is one of the most lucrative markets in the world. 
Because of the size and potential of the market, many corporations around the world have 
made a dash to capture a competitive advantage. In the current era of globalization, the joint 
venture has emerged as an increasingly useful and popular way for firms to carry out their 
foreign investment strategy. Joint ventures between foreign firms and local partners have been 
a particularly important component of the FDI (foreign direct investment) in Asia. This is 
because the governments of these countries have frequently provided a more favorable 
investment climate (e.g., in terms of regulations, approvals, licensing requirements, taxes, 
etc.) to foreign firms entering joint ventures with a local partner than to foreign firms 
attempting to establish a wholly owned foreign enterprise. The governments want part of the 
organization’s equity, ownership and control to remain local. The foreign firm, unfamiliar 
with the business environment and culture of the local market, also finds the joint venture the 
most advantageous way to enter into a strategic alliance with a local firm who is already 
nestled in that market. This paper will highlight important factors and questions concerning 
joint venture operations and their ultimate outcomes. It will also strive to raise new questions 
for the future through three case studies: Beijing-Kentucky Fried Chicken (Beijing-KFC), 





The People's Republic of China (PRC) is one of the most lucrative markets in the world.  
Because of the size and potential of the market, international corporations globally have 
made a dash to capture a competitive advantage. Since 1979, Deng Xiao Ping’s open -door 
policy has been forcing the PRC to close the gap between itself and the rest of the world, 
especially with respect to technology. The free market reforms helped stimulate China’s 
economy to grow annually at an average of nearly 10% real GDP 1979 to 1998 (China 
Statistical Yearbook 1999). Foreign Direct Investment not only brought in capital but also 
technology. In combination with present-day technology and innovation, the business 
industry as a whole is explosive. Larger shares of control are captured without having large, 
fixed, bureaucratic corporations. A corporation wishing to do business outside of its 
national boundaries can choose among several organizational options, ranging from the 
creation of a wholly owned foreign enterprise to a simple technology and licensing 
agreement with a local company. In the current era of globalization, the joint venture has 
emerged as an increasingly useful and popular way for firms to carry out their foreign 
investment strategy and as a wise median between these two extremes.   
Joint ventures between foreign firms and local partners have been a particularly 
important component of the FDI (foreign direct investment) in Asia. This is because the 
governments of these countries have frequently provided a more favorable investment 
climate (e.g., in terms of regulations, approvals, licensing requirements, taxes, etc.) to 
foreign firms entering joint ventures with a local partner than they have to foreign firms 
attempting to establish an entirely foreign enterprise. The governments want part of the 
organization’s equity, ownership and control to remain local.  The foreign firm, unfamiliar 
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with the business environment and culture of the local market, also finds the joint venture 
the most advantageous way to enter into a strategic alliance with a local firm who is already 
nestled in that market (Makino & Delious 1996; Meschi & Roger 1994). 
Despite the joint venture’s popularity as a foreign inve stment strategy, as we will later 
observe with the assistance of several case studies, joint ventures have often run into 
trouble and too often have failed entirely. It is of utmost importance to examine the 
complexities of the joint venture operation. Foreign multinational executives have to be 
willing to take the time and the energy necessary to ask questions for the future. This paper 
will highlight some of the questions and factors that should be raised and the outcomes that 
foreign multinational corporations in the past have experienced in the past.   
The three case studies that will be examined and analyzed in this paper are Beijing-
Kentucky Fried Chicken (Beijing-KFC), Pacific Dunlop China, and Shanghai Volkswagen.  
In 1987, Beijing-KFC, a leading American fast food franchise, decided to take its service 
industry to Beijing. Along with a piece of American popular culture, American managers 
also brought with them notions of how people in the world should operate. This would lead 
to conflicts in expectations and roles of all parties involved. In 1995, Pacific Dunlop 
decided that it was time to venture into the Chinese market. The Australian-based clothing 
and textiles manufacturer, however, ran into major trouble with the delegation of tasks. 
China’s labo r force lacked qualified middle managers, which left the foreign managers 
doing everyone’s work. How could they have imposed a capitalist drive onto a society that 
still remains very socialist? Shanghai Volkswagen, the Sino-German joint venture, was 
established in 1984.  Because of the financial and political support of both the Chinese and 
German governments, the joint venture had a lot of room in which to stretch its wings. 
Since the corporation was not in a service-based industry, raising quality standards was  
little easier. Not only were they able to find suppliers who were willing to devote time and 
energy into raising product quality, Shanghai Volkswagen also set up the supplier parts 
network that, in return for shares of the profit, revolutionized the supply-side of the 
automotive industry (Upton 1995). 
From these three case studies, we can see that there are several similarities and 
anomalies that are specific to doing business in the PRC. There is an overarching theme of 
different attitudes and perceptions regarding product quality. There is a tendency for foreign 
managers looking at a situation to say that “this is bad”, or “this is wrong”, or “this is not 
how it should be done”. But this is clearly a biased, ethnocentric view. It is extremely 
important to note that the two cultures are distinctly different. Chinese workers were 
unfamiliar with Western technology, which often led to western managers classifying them 
as “unskilled”. In truth, there was simply a difference in the way the two corporate cultures 
organized their workplaces. Therefore it is paramount to observe what cultural, political 
and economic customs and nuances exist before assuming that the society is “inferior” or 
“flawed”. This is why these three case studies, in further analysis, can be extremely useful 
in depicting patterns in Sino-Foreign joint ventures.  
All businesses attempt to operate efficiently within a web of uncertainty. There is such 
an enormous quantity of complex information that must be addressed by a corporation, 
including novel interactions and gross unpredictability in the environment that one cannot 
possibly consider all variables beforehand. This is amplified in cross-cultural business 
ventures. There are anomalies that are just as important, if not more so, to examine and 
discuss. Realistically, one cannot know a global truth, but can instead address questions that 
have arisen in the past, observe the actions that were taken and their implications and raise 
questions that are corporation-specific.   
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This paper provides an overview and analysis of the threats and opportunities presented 
to both the foreign multinational corporation and the corporate partner from the PRC.  
Using Beijing-KFC, Pacific Dunlop China, and Shanghai Volkswagen experiences as 
examples this paper will address some important factors and questions concerning joint 




2. ANALYSIS OF THE SINO-FOREIGN JOINT VENTURE FACTORS 
 
The preceding review of risks and opportunities presented by joint ventures suggests a 
range of factors which affect the formation of the joint venture, whether with a Chinese 
partner or with a partner in another country. Other management factors include:  
 
• Cultural similarity between the partners 
• Common or complementary goals 
• Trust between the partners 
• Dominance of one partner over the other in decision-making (studies suggest that 
equitable management structures are actually less stable because they are more likely to 
lead to conflict and slow-down the decision-making process) 
 
Building on these factors, we must examine a more comprehensive list of critical issues 
to consider before entering into a joint venture (Lin & Germain 1998; Meschi & Roger 
1994; Bruijn & Xianfeng 1993; Ralston, Holt, Terpstra & Kai-Cheng 1997). In the context 
of this paper, observed patterns were drawn from Beijing-KFC, Pacific Dunlop China, and 
Shanghai Volkswagen in order to determine if any patterns were significant and might be of 
interest to other foreign multinational corporations interested in investment in the People's 
Republic of China. Important questions that have been addressed by these corporations will 
arise from the case study. Equally valuable are the questions that were overlooked, the 
questions that even now require answers. This section will address the patterns seen and 
raise additional questions for the future.  
 
2.1. Trust  
 
As a multinational corporate executive, do you trust your partner? A number of factors 
can lead to distrust, such as communication problems, personal differences, a lack of 
support from middle management and front-line employees, distrust of foreigners on the 
part of local employees, conflicts created through the implementation of human resource 
management policies and technology transfer policies, and strategic mismatches. This begs 
another important question: are you trusted by the local parties, such as the local Chinese 
government and local suppliers?   
This was the question that Pacific Dunlop China raised. They believed that building 
trust had enormous advantages. Steve Littley, divisional manager at Pacific Dunlop China, 
described the importance of cultivating and maintaining trust, and the value of relationships.   
 
“This is much more important that I ever, ever thought it would be. If you don’t have the 
right relationship with people either built on your own, or especially through your partners, it 
doesn’t mean anything that you are prepared to pay a lot to buy something. The customer is 
not King in the People's Republic of China —the supplier is. They will often refuse to sell to 
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you at any price. Most often, they will smile and nod. Then nothing will happen.   
For example there are a series of tests to see how tough you are and how serious you are 
about doing business and working with the Chinese. We would go out to dinner, and I would 
have a few drinks with them, and eat a couple of things from the dishes that they set in front 
of me. Hardly anything to do with business seemed to get done at these meetings. But 
business was being done. They would bring an army of people each of whom would toast to 
me —I would end up plastered. Then they would talk business. I have learned, and to an 
extent they respect me for it. Now, I always take a load of my key guys, and insist that they 
each take a turn being toasted. You have to be willing to adapt. You won’t get the supplies or 
the permit your plant needs to keep running. The deal just won’t happen without doing this 
kind of thing —or if it does, you’ll be compromised as a sh ort term hit, rather than seen as 
worthy of a long-term relationship (Upton 1995).” 
 
Adaptability is the lesson in Littley’s anecdote. Through his flexibility and willingness 
to play along, he was able to secure working relations with many different local Chinese. 
He realized that Pacific Dunlop China’s interests were long -term entities, and that 
cultivating trust was of the essence. In looking at this case study, another issue that arises is 
the threshold at which we begin to trust one another. Are full disclosure and transparency 
necessary to attain trust? How can we gauge levels of trust? Is there any way to define trust 
or is it simply a gut feeling? Is this less an issue of trust and more of an issue of 
predictability? Does anyone truly have enough information as to judge who is or is not 
trustworthy? Furthermore, is trust even a useful concept for discussion, or is it too closely 
associated to notions of culture? 
 
2.2. Partner Compatibility 
 
Do the partners have similar or complementary business interests and goals? The 
partners do not necessarily need to belong to the same business sector. However, if they 
don’t share the same line of business, their businesses must be complementary, for example 
there must be synergy in the operations and goals. Each must add value to the joint venture 
otherwise there is little need for its presence.   
All three case studies bring this factor to light. In Pacific Dunlop China, cotton 
purchasing had originally been carried out at the group level and sourced through Beijing or 
Shanghai, but as local relationships strengthened through the company’s joint venture 
partners, cotton was being sourced locally from the state run Beijing mills. Spandex, Nylon, 
and Elastane had all been originally sourced outside of China, which was expensive. 
Finally, good quality indigenous sources were found, by their partners knowing someone, 
who knew someone else, who knew someone else, and so on. 
Shanghai Volkswagen shows the connection between trust and working relationships 
between partners. Before the joint venture ever got off the ground, the Germans and the 
Chinese had reached a specific agreement on what each side would contribute. The 
Germans would bring the technology and modern management know-how. The Chinese 
would contribute land, factory buildings, and the labor force along with an understanding of 
their society and recommendations on how to be most efficient in that environment. The 
latter became a particularly important tool when the emphasis on a parts supply network 
gained an added measure of urgency and when a timetable for the growth in percentage of 
localized components was written into the joint venture contract.  The Germans and 
Chinese were working together, not against one another. Their shared philosophy was to 
respect, trust, and learn from one another (Upton 1995). 
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2.3. Political Risk 
 
What is the political risk for this venture? What is the local partner’s political liability? 
Before entering into any joint venture, there is a need to assess political risk in the proposed 
operating environment. Issues to consider include the stability of the home country’s 
political regime, political factors in the labor force (e.g., are unions involved?), domestic 
political attitude towards foreign investors and foreign workers, and risk of nationalization. 
Another factor that should be taken into consideration is the political support coming from 
the foreign multinational corporation’s local government.   
The 1989 Tiananmen Massacre caused fear, unrest, and overall unease at being 
associated with the Chinese government. The few thousand casualties from the June 4th 
bloodbath still remain vivid images in everyone’s minds, periodically reinforced and 
rekindled by possibilities of further political unrest. For example, earlier last year when the 
Taiwanese Presidential candidate Lee Teng-hui pushed the independence movement, the 
PRC fired missiles into the Taiwan Strait, causing the United States to send in its Pacific 
fleet. Such political drama affects business ventures and international public relations, not 
to mention the dramatic toll it takes on relationships with overseas Chinese business, which 
in this case is primarily comprised of Hong Kong and Taiwanese multinational corporations.   
The PRC’s recent crackdown on the Fa Lun Gong move ment is another possibility for 
turmoil. The sheer number of Chinese involved in Fa Lun Gong concerns the Chinese 
government, which has taken a rather harsh view that this group is more of a cult rather 
than an exercise or spiritual movement. As the Chinese government continued its 
nationwide roundup of Fa Lun Gong members, Human Rights Watch said that China's 
intensified campaign against the exercise and meditation group clearly violated United 
Nations human rights standards (Jendrzejczyk 1999). Chinese officials have formally 
arrested more than one hundred individuals and are preparing to put them on trial. Even 
though presently this has not caused major disruptions to business interactions, it continues 
to create uncertainty for foreign partners.  
The Shanghai Volkswagen case study (Ú Á” fiÎ  ́ & ◊ Ÿ̆ •À  ̄ 1998) exemplifies how 
governments’ attitudes, with respect to the joint venture, can tip the balance. Without the 
3.5 million Marks that the German government had supplied for the establishment of 
adequate training facilities, both administrative and engineering personnel would have 
fallen short, and skill quality and production manufacturing would have collapsed 
altogether. Shanghai Volkswagen was smart, and perhaps a little lucky, in its proceedings 
with the local Chinese government. Article 31 from the Chinese government’s 1994 policy 
for the automotive industry stated that: 
 
1) Enterprises shall establish their own research and development infrastructure and 
be capable of developing new generation products in the People's Republic of 
China. 
2) Such enterprises shall demonstrate an ability to make “world class” high-
technology products. 
3) Such Enterprises must balance their foreign exchange accounts primarily by 
exporting their own products. 
4) In selecting components, with all other things equal, local parts shall be given 
preference (Upton 1996). 
 
Shanghai Volkswagen decided that because it was far too costly to import technology, 
they had to develop it domestically. In taking this long-term stance, they aligned themselves 
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most favorably with the government that was looking to boost the Chinese economy. The 
government and Shanghai Volkswagen both believed that innovation in technology would 
benefit all involved. Not only were the government and the industry grateful for the know-
how entering the PRC, but this was amplified when Shanghai Volkswagen began sending 
key engineers from the Chinese suppliers overseas to train with their foreign counterparts. 
Upon return, the Chinese were happy to see that these engineers were able to elevate their 
colleagues’ technological skill levels. The government’s support was crucial in attaining a 
foothold in the automotive market. Shanghai Volkswagen was given special tax reliefs 
under Chinese guidelines for advanced technology partnerships, which was a standard two 
year tax holiday and special six year reduced tax rate exclusive to Shanghai Volkswagen in 
exchange for promised technology transfer. In 1992, Shanghai Volkswagen was deemed by 
the Chinese government to be the “best joint venture in China”. 
 
2.4. Economic and Industry Conditions 
 
What are the basic economic and industry conditions in the proposed local 
environment? Factors to take into account in assessing local industry conditions include 
availability of supplier networks, reliability of suppliers and regulatory factors affecting the 
target industry. Issues to consider include basic economic stability (e.g., look at 
macroeconomic indicators such as inflation rate, growth in GDP, debt level, currency 
stability, etc.), trade regimes, and the infrastructure and basis of the economy. 
One major obstacle that needs to be touched on is that of currency conversion.  Soft 
currencies, like the People's Republic of China’s reminbi (RMB) are not backed by gold 
and are often fixed at unrealistic exchange rates. Therefore, nations with hard currencies, 
like the U.S. dollar or the British pound, are reluctant to convert their assets into RMB.  
Because of fluctuating exchange rates, soft currency generally does not instill much 
widespread confidence in the global market and can usually be employed domestically, only. 
In all three cases, this made importation of foreign goods problematic, which forced the 
multinational corporations to search for high quality domestic suppliers. 
It is important to examine how Shanghai Volkswagen was able to attain a significant 
competitive advantage in the PRC’s automobile market. Sometimes both the foreign and 
Chinese partners work well at the top level while the joint venture as a whole does not 
progress due to problems emerging at the production level. Volkswagen was quick to point 
out that the PRC was not known for its ability to manufacture complex products with 
dependable quality. The primary reason was that most Chinese enterprises have been 
originally set up to service only small, local markets. Operations were not designed for 
national competition, and certainly not for international. Procedures were often not up to 
international quality standards, and many workers were not accustomed to such close 
scrutiny of their work. Low cost Chinese labor would only translate into cheap automobiles 
if the component was not be made up to Volkswagen’s standards. Otherwise, the supplies 
would have to be imported and the high import tariffs of 25-40% would have cancelled out 
the savings on labor. Still the fundamental problem remained: where to find suppliers that 
could make parts up to German standards. Chinese manufacturers were complacent in the 
way that they conducted business and had little reason to change. 
From the examples set by many multinational corporations, it appeared to Shanghai 
Volkswagen that the answer is to take a number of actions and procedures. Since the quality 
of the labor force is the key to the quality of production, one of these procedures is on site 
training and continuing education of the work force. Workers must have an understanding 
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of the true meaning of quality and its importance in the success of a manufacturing firm. 
This investment can be seen as an infrastructure investment and its long-term benefit is 
immeasurable. In the example of Shanghai Volkswagen, most of the production workers 
only had junior high school level education. All the new manufacturing hires were given 
three-year training courses that included classroom lessons and practical training in 
machinery, welding, and forging. Training for sales and secretarial staff lasted two years, 
including lessons in accounting and bookkeeping. In addition to this on site training, 
Shanghai Volkswagen actively sponsored adult education in night schools for its workers. 
The company also provided overseas training for its local engineers, managers and financial 
staff. Such programs were designed to improve workers’ understanding of quality, hence 
raising the product quality to the standards of excellence defined by ISO 9000, the 
international standard in quality measures (Upton 1996).  
 
2.5. Market Conditions 
 
A multinational corporate executive must ask: what are the conditions of the market? Is 
it favorable or volatile? Is the market sustainable? To answer these questions he or she must 
address issues such as supply and demand, domestic markets for materials and labor, and 
appraisal of the competition, both foreign and domestic. 
The important point to highlight here is that the People's Republic of China will 
inevitably be one of, if not the most powerful player in this global market. If this particular 
nation was broken up into four countries of roughly equal size, their respective populations 
would rank second, third, fourth and fifth in the world. It is estimated that by the year 2010, 
China will become the largest economy in the world, with rising affluence among the 375 
million urban residents of the coastal cities (Upton 1995). Even a small portion of the 
middle class in this large country could serve as an enormous market, not only as 
consumers, but also as laborers. 
As specific issues pertaining to quality arose, foreign multinationals took steps to entice 
and motivate laborers. Beijing-KFC provided great incentives to lure applicants. As society 
moved from a socialist structure to one that was more capitalist and merit-based, people 
strove for more. One of the employees hired stated:  
 
“ As an English teacher I was not well paid. The job was very dull, although most of my 
students enjoyed learning English. Still I wasn’t getting ahead. I was teaching English, but I 
wasn’t learning English, I had no one to speak to. At Beijing -Kentucky Fried Chicken, you 
have more chances to use and learn English. We are paid more here but we also work harder. 
The base salary started at 140 RMB a month. Each job was rated on a scale of 100. Each job 
had it’s own standards set; if the standards were not met, we got point taken off. This also 
meant a smaller bonus. The average bonus each month was from 50-150 RMB. The best I 
could ever expect in a factory would be about 120 RMB a month … (Morrison & 
Beamish1989).”  
 
This quote may sound a little strange, stating that not only does an employee at 
Kentucky Fried Chicken make more than an English teacher, but also that the job is more 
strenuous. Kentucky Fried Chicken struggled to develop a new definition of quality in the 
PRC; to push their employees go beyond the status quo. This novel concept of exceeding 
societal norms gave these Chinese employees the impression that they were working harder, 
and they were, if you compared them to other Chinese employees in the food industry. Yet, 
in comparison to their foreign counterparts they still fell sub-par by foreign standards.  
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Almost identically, Shanghai Volkswagen attacked this problem by creating a pay 
structure, which tied the worker’s income directly to the quality of his or her job 
performance as we do in our United States domestic businesses. Production line workers at 
Shanghai Volkswagen are paid an average of 1300 RMB per month. The base pay of each 
employee is adjusted by a premium coefficient, which is determined by his or her line 
supervisor. The premium coefficient operates on a sliding scale of 0.2 to 0.8 (Upton 1996). 
This coefficient for each employee is calculated from a formula based on the number of 
units and the number of defects produced per production cycle. This pay structure gives 
workers incentives to produce quality products.   
But turn to the market as a whole. Since all of these case studies predate the Asian 
financial crisis, there is no data presented in this paper depicting the impact the crisis will 
have on future joint ventures. The market conditions have an enormous impact on the 
country socially, which will inevitably lead to greater consequences. The crisis jeopardizes 
the hard-won results of East Asia's record, which is reflected in better living standards for 
hundreds of millions of Asians, giving them longer life expectancy, better health and 
education, and providing millions of others with the chance to rescue themselves from 
poverty and lead more hopeful lives. These achievements are real and must be safeguarded. 
But even before the crisis struck, there is much more work to be done.  
 
• Although poverty for the region as a whole has declined, 350 million people were 
still living on less than US$1 a day; tens of millions of others live just above the 
poverty line.  
• Rising inequality among geographic regions, between city and countryside, and 
among skill groups led to wage disparities that have undermined the region's 
relative equality.  
• Most countries have virtually no unemployment insurance, social safety nets, and 
little provision for old-age pension insurance. Korea, for example, has relied on 
rapid growth and lifetime employment to provide social security for its citizens, 
while Thailand and Indonesia have relied upon rural family ties.  
 
The ongoing financial difficulties threaten to aggravate these problems and erase the 
gains made by millions; therefore, it is imperative that multinational corporations be wary 
of not only the market conditions themselves, but of social sub factors which may have 




What are the major issues related to technology? Questions to consider include the 
following: What is the availability of technology (e.g., will it be necessary to import all 
technologies or are local resources available)? What are the regulations and policies 
pertaining to the transfer of technology? Are there sufficient intellectual property 
protections? 
When we examine technology on a micro level in the PRC, we can see that much of the 
nation is not prepared. This was very much the case with Pacific Dunlop China. Over-
reliance on computer systems was dangerous because computer viruses were an endemic 
problem that could not be cured in the PRC as easily as they could have been in the West.  
Previously, a virus attacked the system so fiercely that Pacific Dunlop China’s finance 
department was left keeping their books with paper and pen. Janet Mok, Finance and 
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Accounting manager describes the pandemonium.  
  
“We were dead for a week. The virus went through the plant like wildfire.  Everyone 
says this is a big problem in China and it is. Another one of those things that sounds 
completely trivial when you are at home, but here it stops the operation dead. Western virus 
protection does not work against Chinese viruses and they are everywhere, on every disk. 
Even the CAD systems controlling the knitting machines were affected, meaning we couldn’t 
produce anything. We managed to get some IBM people out here, but it took them almost a 
week to clean the plant. The machines aren’t even on a network!  And they were dying left, 
right and center. It was unbelievable.” The virus problem was widespread throughout the 
People's Republic of China for two main reasons. First, virus transmission was facilitated by 
relatively liberal interpretation of copyright law in China concerning the duplication of 
software. While all software used in the plant itself was legal, people would bring disks into 
work to try out “borrowed” software, and use advance copies of newly released versions. The 
disks inevitably contained viruses. Even repeated proscription by Littley had not stopped the 
practice. Second, the viruses that existed were Chinese strains, mostly invented by hackers 
with time and imagination. Many Chinese viruses were not only unknown, but fully immune 
to Western virus-killing programs (Bruijn & Jia 1993). 
  
If workers will not desist from bringing in infected files and transmitting the virus in the 
workplace, what can managers do? Policies in China are difficult to enforce. Cleaning up 
after problems is time-costly and frankly, too late. The Pacific Dunlop China case study 
fails to demonstrate how to best tackle this problem. Perhaps, as technology continues to 
innovate, solutions will begin to emerge in other joint ventures. 
For Shanghai Volkswagen we see a different picture when speaking of technology.  
Overall technology and quality standards soared high in the automotive industry because 
Shanghai Volkswagen was willing to compensate their suppliers generously. This spawned 
a mindset of excellence. Shanghai Volkswagen was willing to pay a purchase price capped 
at the price of a similar import plus custom duties as well as guaranteeing a profit for every 
manufacturer in its parts supplier network. But taken even further, this mindset began to 
revolutionize how open the market actually became.   
The Chinese and Foreign suppliers were encouraged to form technology and licensing 
agreements in which the Chinese partner would bring the necessary resources such as land, 
labor, and machinery, while the foreign partner would bring the technology and the 
expertise. Often, when it came to renewing these contracts, the Chinese partner involved 
would have been so happy with the technology transfer and the training they received that 
they felt that it was time to work independently, thus bumping the foreign partner out of the 
picture. Frequently, the products that these wholly Chinese owned corporations produced 
slipped in quality as the Chinese firm tried to find shortcuts in production. These products 
were often rejected by Shanghai Volkswagen. Then Shanghai Volkswagen advised this 
supplier to seek out advice in improving production. Many times, the Chinese supplier 
requested the services of its former partner, at which time they would frequently sign a 
formal joint venture agreement. This time, when the products were submitted to Shanghai 
Volkswagen, they met necessary quality requirements. Therefore, as corporations begin to 
work cooperatively across national borders, we can observe evidence of the cultivation of 
trust and better working relationships. 
As alluded in Figure 1, however, the Chinese have the potential, after the handover of 
the technology has taken place, to serve as the foreign multinational corporation’s direct 
competitor. Will this supposition lead to the less sharing of information? Could problems 
arise with the emergence of information that is not 100% accurate? Enforcement of patent 
and copyright laws is practically non-existent in the PRC’s feeble legal system. Therefore is  
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there any way to protect the information that enters China, or does it automatically become 
public knowledge when it crosses the border? 
 





















2.7. Cultural Issues 
 
What is the culture in the proposed environment? The literature on joint ventures and 
multinational business operations indicates that often the biggest single stumbling block in 
establishing a successful multinational joint venture is culture (Bruijn & Jia 1993). 
Differences in the cultures of the two partners can create conflicts in terms of goals, 
management structures, human resources policies, and efficiency of daily operations. The 
failure to appreciate cultural differences can often lead to a complete breakdown in 
communications, which in turn may put the entire venture in jeopardy.   
 
2.7.1. The Primacy of Culture.  
 
The work of Hofstede and others such as Earley, Huo & Steers, Ralston, et al., Bruijn & 
Jia, Adler, et al. has pinpointed a number of areas where cultural conflict between Chinese 
and foreign partners is most likely to occur. Particularly noticeable are conflicts between 
the Westerner’s  individualistic orientation and the Chinese partner’s collectivist orientation. 
These differences have important implications for issues such as the design and 
management of human relations systems. For example, creating incentive plans which will 
be effective in the Chinese work setting will assist the motivation of the employees. In 
addition, these structures may be the most appropriate for operations in the Chinese 
environment while the Western partner may have moved away from hierarchical, 
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An excellent case study to examine for this particular point is Beijing Kentucky Fried 
Chicken. Being the first to enter the PRC, they encountered new cross-cultural tribulations 
and long hours of frustration. American multinational managers set quality and service 
standards that were commensurate with conventional American corporate norms, but the 
standards at which the native Chinese employees’ perform ance fell short. The Chinese 
employees were sweeping the floors far fewer times than their American counterparts back 
in the United States (Morrison & Beamish 1989). The American multinational managers’ 
insistence that the Chinese employees’ interpretation of “clean” was not clea n enough did 
not convince the native employees, who believed that they knew what the customers 
acknowledged to be adequate sanitary conditions. It is important to understand that the 
multinational corporations are representatives of a culture, in this case American popular 
culture, which the Chinese, for the most part, have neither a vested interest in nor a firm 
understanding of. If they cannot understand and appreciate it at the societal level, how are 
they to understand and appreciate it at the corporate level? The American managers needed 
to identify and be fully aware of this. They could not assume that the Chinese employees 
will simply understand the corporate standards and values or even wish to comply with 
their orders. The Chinese employees were written off as being indignant and insubordinate, 
but it is possible that they simply could not understand the value of the organization that 
they were working in and therefore could not have had a vested interest in the corporate-set 
standards.   
The Chinese society is not one that regards service with admiration. The fu wu yuan, 
service people, are often looked down upon by other Chinese, and as a result have become 
increasingly rude and resentful of their station. This is perhaps engrained into the society’ s 
culture. Other cultures, like the Americans and even more so, the Japanese, find no issues 
with service. People at all levels of social status in Japanese society engage in service 
oriented activities with pride. But in Chinese society, this tends to be a task where often 
there is no incentive to bring “service with a smile.” Accordingly the foreign managers 
need to be aware of the cultural and societal foundation to employee actions, or lack thereof. 
This is just one of the reasons why Chinese employees have such a difficult time abiding by 
corporate requirements. 
In a socialist society, people work collectively to accomplish their everyday tasks. Food, 
shelter, and all the necessities are secured for them under this type of system. The quality of 
the work is not of the greatest importance. Consequently employees are concerned only 
merely with the completion of a task often disregarding the level of workmanship. In the 
PRC, employment is theoretically still guaranteed to all people, although this is slowly 
changing as state-owned enterprises are beginning to dissolve. The threat of being fired 
does little to frighten the employee into submission; therefore another tactic to instill 
personal motivation for excellence must be taken. As an alternative, there is a need to 
rethink and redevelop a new corporate ethic for foreign corporate enterprises. 
To make a case for one example, Beijing-Kentucky Fried Chicken could have easily 
constructed a rigid description and schedule as to the tasks necessary to maintain this global 
corporate standard. This schedule would notify each employee what time they are to sweep 
the floors and how many often. Beijing-KFC’s mistake was leaving it to the employee to 
define on his or her own what “clean” was clean enough. It is important to remember that 
constant turnover of employees was costly as a result of ill-spent training. With inconsistent 
staffing, a sense of corporate culture and values never had an opportunity to manifest. It 
should have been extremely important to have open, strong lines of communication and 
understanding among the heads of the corporation, management and local employees 
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because it would have emitted an atmosphere of commitment to the employee. This could 
have served as an incentive for employees to not only want to hold onto their present 
position, but also strive to excel within the corporation. 
Another important area of potential cultural conflict, as Hofstede observes, is long-term 
orientation. This is highlighted in the previous case study. Hofstede and others have 
demonstrated that people from Chinese cultures tend to be much more future-oriented than 
their Western counterparts (Hofstede 1991). This will impact planning on issues such as 
investment strategies, short-term profitability goals, payback times, and even the time to 
complete negotiation and planning.  
 In a society, historically, where all pertinent information was handed down, very little 
independent thinking was encouraged. But now, such culture presents quite a problem. 
Divisional manager of Pacific Dunlop China, Steve Littley explained.   
 
“ The first three months when I arrived —I didn’t know what had hit me. You feel like 
you’re Robinson Crusoe with 350 Man Fridays. And like Robinson Crusoe, you have to find a 
way of communicating. I was running around trying to work out why things happened a 
certain way and why I couldn’t change them. I didn’t understand them . They didn’t 
understand me. They find it very hard to come to grips with change. You have to tell them 
how to do everything at first, but then you’re very quickly in a position where you are relied 
on for everything. People would never come to me and say they think that I’m making a 
mistake. My style had become quite autocratic in some ways, but I need to be autocratic to get 
things done, but that stifles responsibility. It’s a catch -22” (Upton 1995). 
 
Labor was abundant, but not very useful since workers could not think for themselves. 
Managers were left to do their own duties in addition to those not done or botched by their 
employees. 
Information typically only traveled down the organizational structure, and any 
information received from the reverse direction was highly suspected. To compound the 
problems, Chinese managers often just said yes —that they understood a problem —when 
they did not. They would then procrastinate until it was too late to solve the problem.  
This forced the foreign managers to always be on their toes and seek out information on 
their own, taking large quantities of time and effort. This was a disastrous problem during 
the Great Leap Forward, as the people out in the countryside were afraid to send accurate 
information back to Chairman Mao. This was in fear of losing face, for on paper it seemed 
that they were less productive than the neighboring town, whose figures were typically 
exaggerated. Pacific Dunlop China had to find a system that cultivated trust, confidence and 
ultimately, a vested interest in the business partnership- be it between two managers, a 
manager and an employee, or between employees- in hopes of instilling a sense of self-
reliance in a reluctant atmosphere. 
Empirical studies of Sino-Foreign joint venture performance have confirmed that 
cultural differences between partners negatively impact joint venture performance, leading 
to increased conflict and a lack of responsiveness to market demands (Ralston, et al. 1997; 
Lin & Germain 1998; Meschi & Roger 1994; Adler, et al. 1989; Barkema, et al. 1996; 
Barkema & Vermeulen 1997). In their recent study, Barkema and Vermeulen sought to 
discover what specific cultural differences were most likely to lead to problems in joint 
ventures.  
These researchers measured cultural differences along Hofstede’s five dimensions:  
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1. Power distance 
2. Uncertainty avoidance,  
3. Individualism-collectivism 
4. Masculinity-femininity 
5. Long-term orientation 
 
Barkema & Vermeulen’s results, which were tested on longitudinal data covering 828 
foreign entries of 25 Dutch multinational corporations in 72 countries between 1966 and 
1994, have important implications for Sino-Foreign joint ventures: 
 
Differences in the cultural backgrounds of partners cause problems in joint ventures but, 
as this study shows, some differences are more disruptive than others. Differences in 
uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation, in particular, cause problems. These 
differences have a negative impact on joint venture survival... Apparently, these differences, 
which translate into differences in how joint venture partners perceive and adapt to 
opportunities and threats in their environment, are more difficult to resolve than differences 
along the other three dimensions. Perhaps cultural differences regarding power distance, 
individualism and masculinity are more easily resolved because they are mainly reflected in 
different attitudes towards the management of personnel – something firms can make explicit 
agreements about before entering the partnership (Barkema & Vermeulen 1997).  
 
Eliminating as much uncertainty as possible is always in the best interest of the joint 
venture as a whole. David Lau, Group Director of Pacific Dunlop China’s Clothing and 
Textile Operations affirmed this notion. “On the subject of joint ventures, I can’t emphasize 
enough how important it is to ensure that the articles of association are really specific and 
not left vague. The Chinese language is very ambiguous at the best of times —and if you 
leave things vague, you can be sure it’ll hurt later (Upton 1995).” 
Beijing-KFC was not clear in what roles each partner would have in the day-to-day 
operation of the joint venture. A major topic of discord was, as mentioned before, on 
quality, service, and cleanliness standards. Everyone had an opinion. The employees 
believed that sales would not suffer and morale would improve with a slackening of the 
corporate standards. The local partners felt that they knew the Chinese customer well 
enough to know that these high standards were a waste of time and energy. Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, as a corporation, was angry that their Chinese partners were overstepping their 
authority, and assessed why they chose those partners and what role they thought they were 
supposed to take on. Animal Production was supposed to play the role of the supplier: 
secure the chickens and the produce, nothing more. The Tourist Bureau carried two duties. 
The first was to secure the location, which they accomplished. Second, they were supposed 
to facilitate a working relationship with the local government, which as sales and reputation 
grew, diminished the Tourist Bureau’s importance. With respect to the employees, they 
were simply to do what they were told: no questions asked, no opinions asked for. But this 
framework was never laid down from the beginning, and made interactions exceedingly 
difficult.  
One point that was especially interesting was that the manager KFC sent was a Chinese 
American. The Americans felt that sending someone who spoke Chinese fluently and 
appeared Chinese would help to ease their entry into this foreign locale. But it only served 
to complicate matters. The Chinese employees and partners saw a Chinese face on an 
American manager and assumed that he would intrinsically understand the root of their 
cultural beliefs when in fact he was quite far removed. Their expectations were for him to 
internalize their way of thinking and then relent. In dealing with Caucasian managers, the 
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Chinese often felt that they could “get away” with more, but they often used double 
standards. They seem more willing around the Caucasian foreign manager since their 
company has an interest in the foreign nation and its people. However, there is some 
conscious or unconscious resentment toward Chinese who left their home country. Now, 
they have returned, talented and well to do, and envy and bitterness lay heavy in the air. 
This is not an issue that is specifically addressed anywhere in the KFC case study, perhaps 
to make the distinction between the West and China more black and white, but it would 
seem that this is an extremely important cultural concern for which more data need to be 
gathered. 
Lin & Germain, who specifically examined Sino-American joint ventures in their 
research on cultural differences and joint venture performance, also found that some 
cultural differences were more critical than others. Their overall findings illustrated that 
cultural similarity (across all dimensions) is a “critical antecedent for joint venture 
success”(Lin & Germain 1998). Therefore, in many cases, finding the similarities between 
the cultures opened up opportunities once overlooked. 
Multinational joint ventures between foreign and Chinese firms present a wide range of 
opportunities and advantages to both partners. The potential to reap the benefits of these 
opportunities will be maximized when the partners can achieve a synergy of goals, 
resources, and outputs. As this review has shown, no joint venture is free of risk. Ventures 
between Chinese and foreign partners appear to be especially risky because of the inherent 
danger of conflict stemming from dramatic cultural, linguistic, political and economic 
differences. While cultural differences may pose the most significant threat to the outcome 
of the Sino-Foreign joint venture because they span the border between two nations, studies 
of Sino-Foreign joint ventures do not go so far as to suggest that these joint ventures are 
doomed to fail. Indeed, recent research has revealed that some cultural differences are more 
critical than others in ensuring the ease of operation of Sino-Foreign joint ventures. These 
research results, --which point to the critical roles of differences in uncertainty avoidance 
(risk-taking), long-term orientation, and problem-solving approaches,-- provide potential 





The global marketplace puts demands on corporations that mandate the formation of 
joint ventures. The trend toward globalization will undoubtedly continue —the extent to 
which corporations can successfully integrate with foreign partners will shape their futures 
in the economy of the 21st century. There are a few points to highlight that will conclude 
what has been discussed so far. Foreign multinational corporations attempting to capture a 
competitive advantage in the PRC find the joint venture the most efficient way to conduct 
business. The local knowledge and relationships are vital pathways into the market for 
companies without prior experience. Because of the large investment of both human 
resources and capital that is necessary for the development of infrastructure and skilled 
employees, joint ventures are not meant to be short-term projects.   
A foreign multinational executive wants to know if he can develop a globally 
integrative approach. Can there be a formula or template for joint ventures that his company 
can use in the PRC that will guarantee success? Corporations are like individuals; built on 
independent philosophies and cultures, which make them unique in the world. The three 
case studies examined in this paper are from three distinct industries. They represent only a 
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sliver of the business industry pie. Moreover, each exists at a distinct point in time.  
Perhaps the information that has arisen from the case studies examined has not manifested 
in the form of solid advice, but instead has opened the doors to considering the sorts of 
issues being tackled by several multinational corporations forming joint ventures in the 
PRC.  
It is crucial to avoid making the assumption that if every multinational corporation acts 
in one such manner they will achieve ultimate success. Instead we must ask what questions 
and factors did the multinational corporations address in the course of their joint ventures 
and what insight does this lend to our own businesses. How were the problems handled and 
did an eventual resolution come about? What issues did they neglect to raise? Are there 
ways to reconcile the dilemmas that arise from being ill-equipped? 
With this said, there remain important patterns observed across joint ventures in the 
case studies discussed in this paper. There are recurring problems, as examined earlier, 
which are seen in the People's Republic of China. These concerns have long-term 
implications for foreign investors in the PRC. Multinational corporations need to be aware 
of the existence of these issues, and also of how other corporations in similar circumstances 
dealt with the situation. They must consider the consequences these actions have on the 
ultimate outcome of the joint venture, both favorable and unfavorable.  
Multinational corporations may want to know if these are trends in the market. For 
example are there particular industries that are better suited for joint venture partnership in 
the PRC? To respond to this particular question, it is important to remember that this 
venture is an international one. When going overseas to do business, or in any occurrence 
of inter-cultural business relations, one has to realize that standards and ways of doing 
things are culturally and societally engrained in the people. Excellence and pride in the 
service industry were not things that the Chinese were culturally accustomed to. This is not 
to state that service-based industries will not survive in this market, but they must have 
increased awareness of the difficulties that their predecessors have encountered. People in 
the manufacturing industry may have found success in the past, but conditions are changing 
and the environment to which multinational corporations are considering entry must be 
constantly reassessed. 
We must remember a joint venture is not a conquest, but a partnership. These multiple 
partners need to devise a way to operate symbiotically. Foreign multinational corporations 
often export their domestic notions of authority, quality, law, politics, education, and the 
general concepts of  “right and wrong”. If one imposes too much force on any single 
object, such as a metal pipe, it will snap. It is necessary to be adaptable and willing to let 
things go slowly. Foreign multinationals remain just that, foreign, therefore they cannot 
expect to come in and run the show. Steps need to be taken by both parties to assimilate and 
understand the premise upon which each partner bases its viewpoint. Neither party can 
merely state their viewpoint and compel their partner to comply. But if steps are taken 
gradually and compromisingly, and corporations are willing to make a long-term 
investment in this market, then any pipe can be yielding. Adaptability carries the potential 
for great returns.   
This paper may not present an approach that is entirely globally integrative, but its 
discussion does seem more useful than the rhetoric that is often provided by those believing 
they have devised the perfect “cookbook” approaches to analyzing joint venture issues.  
Providing a broad spectrum of questions that the multinational corporations must consider, 
the conclusions made in this paper seem applicable to the situations of multinational 
executives encountering unprecedented cross-cultural situations. They will, then, be able to 
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ask themselves specific questions under each umbrella category. These findings will serve 
as the springboard for new questions and insight concerning joint ventures and their future 
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